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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-10/10/75 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
Respondent, 
- and -
CONSTRUCTION AND GENERAL LABORERS UNION, 
LOCAL 190, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
On January 3, 1975 the Construction and General Laborers Union, 
Local 190 (Laborers) filed an improper practice charge against the City of 
Albany (City) alleging that it violated CSL §§209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d). 
The alleged circumstances constituting the charged violation were that on 
October 29, 1974 the City had recognized the Laborers as the representative of 
certain employees at its land-fill operation, but subsequently entered into a 
consent agreement with another union for a representation election covering such 
employees, among others. The other union is New York Council 66, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (AFSCME). It sought to intervene in this case and the hearing officer 
permitted it to do so. 
The hearing officer found that the City entered into a consent 
agreement with AFSCME pursuant to which land-fill employees were included with 
all other blue-collar employees in the City in a negotiating unit sought to be 
represented by AFSCME. Thereafter, a secret ballot election was held, following 
which AFSCME was certified by us as a negotiating agent for the blue-collar unit 
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However, the hearing officer also found that the events that had transpired on 
October 29, 1974 had not constituted a recognition of the Laborers by the City. 
On that day, the City took over the operation of the land-fill site from a 
private sector employer. The hearing officer found that the City promised the 
Laborers that the land-fill employees would not be hurt by the transfer of the 
operations to the City, and that it would continue to furnish most of the 
benefits to them that they had received from their private sector employer. 
According to the hearing officer, this dialogue with the Laborers was not 
intended to and, in fact, did not, bestow any Taylor Law rights upon the 
Laborers. The Laborers have filed exceptions to this decision of the hearing 
officer. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of the 
parties, we reject some of the hearing officer's conclusions. Those con-
clusions are based in large measure on his interpretation of circumstances 
that are only tangently related to this case. The hearing officer notes that, 
in cases other than the instant one, it is a matter of administrative record 
that the City never voluntarily recognized any employee organization that 
sought to represent City employees, but required it;to•prove its"majority 
status in an election. The City has emphasized that: 
"[A]n election is a democratic way of handling this 
matter and accordingly, the steps outlined in the Taylor 
Law should be taken...." 
As against this, there is the uncontradicted testimony of the City's Mayor that 
he intended to recognize the Laborers. It is clear that the agreement reached 
in the dialogue between the City and the Laborers was not treated in the same 
manner as agreements reached in Taylor Law negotiations. Typically, Taylor Law 
agreements have been approved by the City's Common Council. Indeed, such 
approval is required by CSL §§201.12 and 204-a. Nevertheless, we can not 
ignore the fact that, de facto, this dialogue constituted a negotiation s«f 
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terms and conditions of employment. The City agreed to employ those persons 
who had previously worked for the land-fill contractor. It agreed that, in 
lieu of welfare and pension contributions that had been previously paid to 
certain trusts on their behalf, an equivalent sum of money would be paid 
directly to the employees until it could be ascertained whether the City was 
authorized to make such payments to the trusts. For its part, the Laborers 
_agreed-to-accept-a reduction J.n wages. Beyond- that, -the-parties--agreed- to 
abide by the prior contract between the Laborers and the land-fill contractor. 
That contract was invalid under the Taylor Law in that it lacked the clause 
required by CSL §204-a, contained an invalid union security provision, and 
illegally authorized a right to strike.— 
These circumstances persuade us that the hearing officer erred in 
concluding that the City never intended to, and indeed did not, bestow any 
Taylor Law rights upon the Laborers. Being so persuaded, we now find that this 
case is further complicated by the certification of AFSCME. The conduct of 
the City and the Laborers did not satisfy the requirements of the Taylor Law 
and our Rules of Procedure (§201.6) so as to constitute a bar to a representa-
tion proceeding. AFSCME instituted such a proceeding. That proceeding, which 
was reported in the local press, was regularly processed. The Laborers knew of 
this proceeding, but they did not seek to intervene upon the assurance of the 
City's Mayor that the land-fill workers were not involved. It appears that the 
Mayor of the City had not intended to agree to a blue-collar unit that included 
the land-fill workers and that the City did so because of some oversight or 
breakdown in its internal communications. Only after newspaper reports and 
conversations with the City officials that followed the unit agreement had 
aroused their concern did the Laborers seek official information from this Board 
1^  The Mayor testified without contradiction that he advised the Laborers that 
they would no longer be allowed to strike, but the language of the agreement 
was not changed. QQQ/i 
Board - U-1419 -4 
about the make-up of the blue-collar unit. Ascertaining that the land-fill 
workers were covered by the consent agreement, they informed the trial examiner 
of their claim upon the land-fill workers. The trial examiner responded that thje 
Laborers'only avenue of redress, given the execution of the consent agreement, 
was to seek to intervene and to represent the entire unit. Having neither a 
desire to represent that unit nor a showing of interest in it, the Laborers 
their""triedT""wxtnou't success," to~geTTT:he p ^ 
this point, counsel for the Laborers advised them to initiate the improper 
practice charge. It was done. One day later, the election was held and 
AFSCME was certified as representative of all blue-collar workers, including 
the land-fill workers. 
We conclude that the Laborers did not seek to participate in the 
representation proceeding before the consent agreement was reached because 
of assurances from the City that it had no interests that might be compromised 
in that proceeding. We further conclude that the City, albeit through inad-
vertence, misled the Laborers in giving that assurance. By entering into a 
consent agreement with AFSCME that covered land-fill workers in the blue-
collar unit, it violated CSL §209-a.l(a) and (d). 
We cannot fashion a remedy for this violation that does not compromise 
the rights of one of two innocent parties — the Laborers and AFSCME, but we 
can minimize the injury. According to the record in this case, the City had 
intended to consent to a unit consisting of all blue-collar employees other 
than the land-fill workers. The Laborers had, and have, no interest in blue-
collar workers other than the land-fill workers. AFSCME sought a unit of all 
blue-collar employees, including the land-fill workers, and, by reason of the 
City's violation, had obtained a consent agreement for such a unit. Neverthe-
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less, it is better served, at least temporarily, with a unit of all blue-collar 
employees other than land-fill workers, in which it is certified, rather than 
2 
by no unit at all. This way, the other blue-collar employees may continue to 
be represented in negotiations while the status of the land-fill workers is 
resolved in a representation proceeding. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the reopening of the representation case 
in the Matter of City of Albany (Case No. 
C-1148) to ascertain whether land-fill 
workers should have a separate unit or 
whether they should be included in the blue-
collar unit. Meanwhile, the City shall 
continue to negotiate with AFSCME in the 
balance of the blue-collar unit that was 
certified on January 9, 1975. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
October 10, 1975 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
Fred L. Denson 
2_ In the election, 171 votes were cast for AFSCME and 88 against, with 39 
ballots challenged. Thus, the outcome of the election could not be affected 
by the elimination of the approximately half-dozen persons who work at the 
land-fill site. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
i #2B-10/10/75 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
DI STRICT COUNCIL 37, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
AFL-CLO, 
Charging Party. 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) filed a charge on 
February 3, 1975 alleging that the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (employer) committed an improper practice 
in violation of CSL §209~a.l(d) in that it unilaterally withdrew a benefit 
that it had previously provided, to wit, the granting of time-off with pay 
one-half day during the month of December for the purpose of Christmas 
shopping. The hearing officer dismissed the charge and AFSCME filed 
exceptions to the hearing officer's decision. 
Facts 
Since at least 1963, some categories of non-pedagogical employees 
have been granted one-half day off with pay during the month of December for 
the purpose of Christmas shopping. This practice has not been reflected in the 
negotiated agreements between AFSCME and the employer that covered them since 
January 1, 1968. On December 3, 197^ the employer issued a memorandum stating 
that there would be no further time allowance for Christmas shopping. The 
following day, AFSCME objected that the employer could not repeal this practice 
without first negotiating about it and it demanded the immediate restoration 
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of the one-half day time off for Christmas shopping. On December 10, the 
employer responded that it was under no legal obligation to maintain the 
practice of giving time off with pay for Christmas shopping. Its position was 
that the granting of the time off was originally a unilateral act of the 
employer's Chancellor and that each year thereafter the decision whether or 
not he would continue the practice constituted a discretionary act. 
There was testimony on the question of whether the matter of time 
off with pay for Christmas shopping had come up during negotiations and the 
hearing officer credited the testimony of Frederic Fisher, an assistant 
director of the employer' s office of labor _re 1 atj ons and co V\_ ecti ve bargai ning, 
that it was mentioned twice. Both times the employer advised AFSCME that it 
deemed the granting of time off with pay for shopping to fall within the 
discretion of the Chancellor and that it did not contemplate permi tt i-rig such 
time off in the future without charge to annual leave. On one of these occasionjs, 
Mr. Victor Gotbaum responded on behalf of AFSCME that, "The one-half day for 
Christmas shopping was not to be included in the contract, but we are not 
putting an agreement on it...." 
Hearing Officer's Decision 
The hearing officer determined that the subject of time off for 
Christmas shopping with pay was a mandatory subject of negotiations. He also 
determined that the employer had not communicated to AFSCME before 1972 its 
position that the granting of such time off with pay was a separate act of 
discretion each year. Emphasizing that the practice of granting one-half day 
off with pay for Christmas shopping had been continued without any significant 
change for over ten years, the hearing officer concluded that it was a term 
and condition of employment that could not be withdrawn unilaterally. The 
hearing officer's final conclusion was that AFSCME had waived its right to 
3988 
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negotiate over the matter by agreeing that it "was not to be included in the 
contract...." 
Discussion 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we confirm the 
hearing officer's findings of fact. We also confirm his conclusion that as 
a long-standing past practice, time off with pay for Christmas shopping could nojt 
be withdrawn by the employer unilaterally unless AFSCME had waived its right to 
negotiate over the matter. However, we reject his conclusion that AFSCME 
waived this right. We believe that the hearing officer has misconstrued Mr. 
Gotbaum's response to the employer when the subject was raised during negotiations 
We understand Mr. Gotbaum's words, as testified to by the assistant director 
in the employer's office of labor relations and collective bargaining,— as 
being a refusal to waive its rights. That is the only rational interpre-
tation of the words, "We are not putting an agreement on it". Moreover, this 
conclusion is consistent with Mr, Gotbaum's statement that the employer's 
position would not be included in the contract. Absent an agreement to 
eliminate the past practice, AFSCME considered itself entitled to the 
continuation of that practice. 
Finding that AFSCME did not waive its right to negotiate over a 
change in the employer's practice of providing time off with pay for 
Christmas shopping, we reject the decision of the hearing officer and we 
determine that the employer violated CSL §201-a.l(d). 
— The witness was emphatic that he remembered the phrase used by Mr. Gotbaum. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the above findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, and in view of the specific violation of the Act that we have 
found to have occurred, 
WE ORDER the Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York to negotiate in good faith with District 
Council 37, American. Federat.ion of State, County_a.nd. 
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
October 10, 1975 
^Rober1 TTT He 1 sby-Xha i rman 
M 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
B.OARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent,1 
-and-
COUNCIL.OE. .SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
6F"'THEGITY''OF'NEW Y'OlK, LOCAL 1, SASOC, 
AFL-CIO,— - - —- — -•^ '-•..•-^ -'U:: _ 
Charging Party. 
#2C-10/10/75 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
CASE NO. U-1685 
On August 28, 1975 the hearing officer issued a decision finding 
that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York (employer) had committed an improper practice in violation of CSL 
§201-a.l(d) in that it had improperly refused to agree to a date for the 
commencement of negotiations with the Council of Supervisors and Administrators 
of the City of New York, Local 1, SASOC, AFL-CIO (charging party) until after 
it had resolved its budgetary matters. The hearing officer's decision and 
recommended order was mailed to the parties and was received by both of them 
on September 2, 1975. Transmitted with the decision was a letter stating, 
inter alia: !> 
"Any party to the proceeding may file with the Board an 
original and four copies of exceptions to the Decision and 
Recommended Order within 15 working days after receipt of 
same. A party filing exceptions must simultaneously file 
an original and four copies of a brief in support of excep-
tions, together with proof of service of copies of both docu-
ments upon all other parties. These exceptions must comply 
with the requirements set forth in Section 204.10(b) of the 
Board's Rules of Procedure, as amended." 
On September 24 the employer hand delivered to us exceptions to the 
hearing officer's decision and recommended order. They were hand delivered to 
the charging party on the same day. On September 26, 1975 we received a letter 
from the charging party which constitutes a motion to dismiss the exceptions on 
the ground that they are not timely. A copy of that letter was sent to the 
im 
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employer. The relevant provisions of our Rules are: 
1. 4 NYCRR 204.10 "Exceptions to Hearing Officer's Decision 
and Recommended Order. (a) Within fifteen working days 
after receipt of the decision and recommended order, a 
party may file with the Board...exceptions thereto.... 
such exceptions and briefs shall be served upon all other 
parties...." 
2v- 4 NYCRR-200.9 "Working Days. Theterm- 'working-days'7 as- — 
used herein, shall not include a Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday." 
3. 4 NYCRR 200.10 "Filing; Service. (a) The term "filing1, as 
used herein, shall mean personal serv ice upon the Board or 
an agent thereof, or the act of mailing to the Board not 
less than two days before the due date of any filing. 
(b) The term "service', as used herein, shall mean 
personal service or the act of mailing not less than two 
days before the due date." 
4. 4 NYCRR 204.12 "Request for Extension of Time. A request 
for extension of time within which to file exceptions and 
briefs shall be in writing, and filed with the Board at 
least three working days before the expiration of the required 
time for filing,...." 
5. 4 NYCRR 204.14 "Board Action.... 
(c) Unless a party files exceptions to the decision and 
recommended order of the hearing officer within fifteen 
working days after receipt thereof, the decision and recom-
mended order, or any part thereof which concludes that a 
charge has merit and that remedial action should be required, 
will be final except that the Board may, on its own motion, 
decide to review the remedial action recommended within 
twenty working days after receipt by the parties of the 
decision and recommended order." 
September 23 was fifteen working days after receipt by the employer of the 
hearing officer's decision and recommended order. Accordingly, it was obligated 
to have completed by the end of that day actual delivery of its exceptions and 
brief to the Board and to the charging party, or to have mailed its exceptions 
and brief to the Board and the charging party by September 22 (Sept. 21 was 
a Sunday. See General Construction Law Section 25-a.) The employer had not 
sought an extension of time during which to file exceptions. Thus, on the 
19 
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facts before us and the terms of our Rules of Procedure, we determine that the 
exceptions were not timely and we grant the charging party's motion to reject 
them. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the motion of the charging party to 
reject the employer's exceptions on the 
ground that they are untimely be, and it 
hereby is, granted. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
October 10, 1975 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
/QbUWi.... 
^sepl/ R. Crowley 
JJh~^f^~-
'Fred L. Denso: 
'f<<v% 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
rOCAL 372,"l^istWCt-COUNCIL" 37, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, 
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
Local 372, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Local 372) filed with the New York State 
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), an improper practice charge alleging 
that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(employer) violated §§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act)— by unilaterally implementing a policy requiring 
mandatory termination of employment at age 70 of certain employees represented 
by Local 372 and by refusing to negotiate with the Local concerning that policy. 
The hearing officer concluded that the employer, by refusing to 
negotiate the subject of a mandatory termination age, violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act; the employer filed exceptions to this conclusion. The substance of 
these exceptions is the contention of the employer that the Local had waived its 
right to negotiate on the issue of a mandatory termination policy and there was, 
therefore, no obligation on the part of the employer to negotiate. 
1_ These sections of the Act make it an improper employer practice "...(a) to 
interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their 
rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving 
them of such rights; ...(c) to discriminate against any employee for the pur-
pose of encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation in the 
activities of, any employee organization; or (d) to refuse to negotiate in 
good faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its 
public employees." OOOi 
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The hearing officer found that the employer, had an established policy 
(dating back to 1967) requiring mandatory termination of administrative 
2 
employees at age 70.— Accordingly, he rejected so much of the charge as 
alleges that the employer unilaterally implemented a mandatory termination age 
or otherwise changed an existing term and condition of employment.— However, 
the hearing officer found that the Local was unaware of this mandatory 
termination policy until October_19_7.4 and that the ^ subject of_..a._mandatory 
termination age was neither embodied in the contract nor was it discussed 
previously by the parties in their prior negotiations. Based on this finding, 
he concluded that since this was a mandatory subject of negotiations— and, 
further, since it was neither included in the negotiated agreements nor 
considered during negotiations, there was a duty on the part of the employer 
to negotiate this subject with the Local absent a waiver by the Local. 
Inherent in this result is the conclusion that an existing negotiated 
agreement does not relieve an employer of the duty to negotiate. In reaching 
5 
this conclusion, the hearing officer cited private sector precedent— and 
c 
obiter dictum of this Board.— However, we do not reach this question herein 
because we find that the record supports a conclusion that the Local waived its 
right to negotiate on the issue of mandatory termination age.— 
2_ The term "administrative employee" includes the job titles of "School Aides" 
and "Hourly School Lunch Employees" represented by the Local herein. 
3^  This conclusion of the hearing officer required a dismissal of the charges 
alleging a violation of Section 209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
4^  The parties stipulated that the issue of a mandatory termination age is a 
mandatory subject of negotiations. 
5. NLRB v. Jacobs, 191 F. 2d 680 
6_ In the Matter of North Babylon, 7 PERB 3040, 3042 
7 The hearing officer found that there had been no waiver and endeavored to 
base such finding on' a resolution of credibility of witnesses. We base our 
conclusion of waiver on an analysis of the record and exhibits and not on 
credibility of witnesses. QQO^ 
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Discussion 
The parties negotiated a contract for the School Lunch Employees and a 
contract for the School Aides covering the term July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1974. 
As to the School Lunch Employees Article IX of such contract provides 
"Article IX 
Termination Pay Allowance 
Effective May 1, 1972, employees, after reaching 
ten years ofservice^ who resign or~are-terminated shall 
be paid for accumulated sick leave on the basis of one 
hour for every two hours of accumulated sick leave. 
The maximum termination pay allowance shall not 
exceed 400 hours. 
This Article is to be applicable to employees who 
were terminated on or after September 1971 because of 
attainment of age 70.".^  
Hughes, an officer of the Local appeared as a witness. When asked if 
October 1974 was the first time he was aware of the policy of "forced 
retirement" at age seventy, he responded that "we discussed age seventy" 
referring to the language of the contracts quoted supra. Hughes testified that 
the provisions set forth in Article IX and Article XXII re termination pay of 
Q 
the 1971-74 contracts— were new provisions and that the thrust of the Union's 
position was to provide termination pay for employees who had over ten years 
service. Hughes was asked to explain the reasons for the inclusion of the last 
paragraph of Article IX (also Article XXII) relating to the termination of 
employees "because of attainment of age 70". This question was not given a 
direct response. The essense of Hughes's response was that the conclusion of 
the negotiations of the 1971-74 contract was not reached until the Spring of 
1972 and this in turn gave rise to issues of retroactivity. The union sought 
retroactivity for all employees as to termination pay. This was rejected by 
the employer. The union then proposed a special exception so as to provide 
retroactivity of benefits to those terminated because of attainment of age 70. 
8^  Article XXII of the School Aides contract is in haec verba. 
_9 Set forth supra. 
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The hearing officer asked three times the basis for the inclusion of 
a special provision for age seventy terminations and when so pressed Hughes 
responded "I have no answer for that." 
There can be no doubt that in seeking the inclusion of the provisions 
of the third paragraph of Article IX (also Article XXII) that the Local was 
seeking an exception for employees who were being terminated because of 
attaining the age of seventy so that the benefits would be applicable to those 
who had retired prior to the reaching of an agreement. It seems clear that the 
Local was aware in 1972 that employees were being terminated at age seventy. 
The Local did negotiate as to terminated benefits for such employees and did 
10 
not seek to negotiate on the criterion of age.— Thus we find that the Local, 
though aware of the age seventy criterion, sought only to negotiate on the 
impact of the implementation of such criterion. Therefore, we conclude that 
the Local waived its right to negotiate on the age criterion for the term of 
the extant agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: October 10, 1975 
Albany, New York 
10 Similarly in the successor contract termination benefits were negotiated. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-10/10/75 
I n t h e M a t t e r of : 
Gasje^Ma. J_-QJD2_7-
NASSAU COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS BENEVOLENT : 
ASSOCIATION, INC. 
to review the Implementation of the Provisions BOARD DECISION 
and Procedures enacted by the County of Nassau : & ORDER 
pursuant to Section 212 of the Civil Service 
Law. : 
On May 19, 1975, the Nassau County Correction Officers 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (COBA) filed a petition with this 
Board to review the implementation of the provisions and proced-
ures of the Nassau County Public Employment Relations Board (local 
board) pursuant to section 203-8 of this Board's Rules of Pro-
cedure. The petition, as supplemented by letter dated June 16, 
1975j alleged that the local board has denied petitioner rights 
granted to it under Article 14 of the Civil Service Law by its 
decision in a representation proceeding, in which COBA sought to 
represent a unit of correction officers employed by the Nassau 
County Sheriff's Department. Petitioner also contends that the 
local board "has failed to give these employees the substantially 
equivalent rights to which they would be entitled if their peti-
tion had been filed with the State Board." 
3998 
The petitioner's claim is based on a decision of the local 
board dated April 16, 1975, affirming a hearing officer's Report 
and Recommendations dated December 27 , 1974, which denied COBA's 
petition for certification and decertification. Hearings were 
held before the local board's Hearing Officer, John F. Coffey, 
' EsqT,~on"September 23:,"'"19JMi October" 8"and IT,-~1974rand"before 
the full board on March 25, 1975. This Board has been furnished 
a copy of the transcript for each date of hearing and with, copies 
of both the hearing officer's Report and Recommendations, and a 
copy of the local board's Decision and Order. 
On June 30, 1975, the local board submitted a response to the 
petitioner" which questions the jurisdiction of PERB under section 
212 of the Civil Service Law to sit "as an Appellate Court re-
viewing a substantive unit determination made by the local board." 
As we have stated in an earlier opinion of this Board, Local.2_37J 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2 PERB 3263: 
"Civil Service Law §212 requires this Board 
to review the implementation.of the provisions 
and procedures of a local board. Such review 
can, in the nature of things, only take place 
when the local board has taken specific action 
and that action has been challenged by the 
filing of a petition pursuant to §20;3.'8 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the State Board. Such a 
petition having been filed in this instance, 
the New York State PERB is obliged to review 
the implementation of the local government 
provisions and procedures. This is not an in-
stance of the New York State PERB substituting 
its judgment for that of the local board." 
-2-
>%$%$'• 
Since the instant petition filed pursuant to section 203-8 alleges 
that the local board's procedures have resulted in a denial of 
Taylor Law rights, this Board is obligated to review the imple-
mentation of such local government procedures. 
The contentions of the petitioner do not relate to any pro-
"c"eliur~alHmairt¥r~"B"^  
It is urged that the special working conditions of these employees 
together with the history of representation of these employees by 
the presently certified organization require the establishment of 
a separate negotiating unit. The gravamen of the petition is that 
if COBA's petition for certification and decertification had been 
considered by this Board instead of the local board, such petition 
would have been granted and fragmentation of the existing overall 
unit would have been ordered. Based upon the many decisions of 
this Board involving similar factors, it is our opinion that such 
a contention is, at best, optimistic. But even if true, we stated 
several years ago the standard we would follow in reviewing con-
tentions relating to the merits of a unit determination: 
"The decisions made by the local board 
on September 4, 1968 reflect careful con-
sideration of the issues and may be deemed 
to reflect that board's best judgment within 
the guidelines set forth in the statute. 
It is not contemplated that this Board's 
function of reviewing such determination is 
intended as a method by which this Board 
might substitute its judgment for that of 
the local board in such representation pro-
ceedings." (New York State Nurses Assn., 
2 PERB 3247)• 
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It appears from the hearing officer's report, adopted by 
the local board, that the local board took into consideration the 
statutory criteria in arriving at its unit determination. The 
decision reflects the local board's-"best judgment within the 
guidelines set forth in the statute". The record shows that the 
hearing was conducted in a fair manner and that the petitioner 
was afforded ample opportunity to present.whatever evidence it 
desired to offer. Therefore, we cannot find that the provisions 
and procedures enacted by Nassau County have hot...been implemented 
by the Nassau County Public Employment Relations Board in a 
manner substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures 
set forth in.Article 14 of the Civil Service Law and the Rules of 
Procedure of this Board. 
One further matter must be noted. On September 23y 1975, 
petitioner submitted, in support of its petition, evidence of an 
incident"alleged to have occurred at a meeting of the presently 
certified employee organization held on September 11, 1975. It 
is clear that we cannot take into consideration in this pro-
ceeding evidence of incidents occurring after the determination 
of the local board which is the subject of this review. 
In view of the foregoing, it is 
ORDERED that the petition of the Nassau County Correction 
Officers Benevolent Association be and the same hereby is dis-
missed. 
Dated, Albany, New York 
October 10, 1975 
ROBERT.D. HELSB^, Chairman 
'Mtffl. 6SEPH"'R. "CROWLEY 
ED~L. DENSON 
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STATE OF NEW YORK —-, 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ,JARD 
In the Matter of 
BROOKHAVEN-COMSEWOGUE UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
PORT JEFFERSON STATION TEACHER 
MONITORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
#2F-10/10/75 
CASE NO. C-12 08 
" ~ 'CERTIFTCATION'OF''REPRESENTATIVE'AND ORDER: TO 'NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Port Jefferson Station Teacher 
Monitors Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All school monitors and part-time clericals. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Port Jefferson Station Teacher 
Monitors Association 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
tfith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
legotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
Jetermination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10th day of October , 19 75. 
ROBERT D. "HELSKr, Chairman 
'JOSEPH R. .CROWLEY / 
FRED L. DENSON 
• * « 
STATE OF NEW YORK ' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
TOWN OF SHELDON, 
-and-
Employer, 
#2G-10/10/75 
Case No. C-1259 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
BOCALT2:27, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
- CERTIFICATION"OF-REPRESENTATI-VE-AND-ORDER-TO-NEGOTIATE-
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Service Employees International 
Union, Local 227, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Highway Department of the 
Town of Sheldon in the position of Motor Equipment Operator. 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Service Employees International 
Union, Local 227, AFL-CIO 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 10th day of . October 19 75 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, ^ Chairman 
/if 
;2-68) FfiED L . BENSON '•m#w®. 
STATE OF NEW YORK -' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 750 , COUNCIL 6 6 , AMERICAN 
FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
#2H-10/10/75 
Case No. C-1267 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the. authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 750, Council 66, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All employees in the highway, sanitation, parks 
and grounds, landfill, building and maintenance, 
and central garage divisions of the public works 
department, and all sewer department employees. 
Excluded: Village manager, village clerk, deputy village 
clerk, village treasurer, housing and building 
inspector, superintendent of public works, 
superintendent of sewer department and all 
other'employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 750, Council 66, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
PERB 58(2-68) 
Signed on the 10th day of October 19 75, 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, Chairman 
FRED L. DENSON i ) 
